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ABSTRACT
COVID-19 contact tracing apps are one of the best tools we currently have available to
avoid a potential second wave of COVID-19. However, sufficient critical mass in terms of
uptake is required for these apps to be effective. Given the low adoption rate, a better
understanding of the users' perspective is important to define measures to drive their adoption.
Building on the privacy calculus, this study analyses the adoption of COVID-19 apps as a
benefit-risk trade-off and provides empirical insights for Germany and Switzerland, which have
been among the more successful adopters. Interestingly, we find many commonalities between
both countries, which may be explained by their geographic and cultural proximity, but also with
the similarities in app design and launch. However, we observe significant differences in benefit
and risk perception between different groups of the population, which we classify as advocates,
critics, and undecided. The findings reveal that all groups recognize the benefits of COVID-19
apps and confirm that reservations about privacy are the biggest hurdle to uptake. For the
undecided and critics, our empirical data also confirms the privacy paradox, i.e. the differences
between general attitudes and concrete behaviour.
Keywords: Contact tracing, COVID-19, privacy calculus, adoption, proximity tracking,
benefits-risk trade-offs, mobile apps
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INTRODUCTION
COVID-19 contact tracing apps are, undoubtedly, one of the best tools we currently have
to avoid the second wave of COVID-19, further incidence spikes and a return to lockdown.
Experts estimate that a critical mass threshold of 60% of the country’s population would be
required to ensure these apps are effective (University of Oxford 2020). If uptake levels remain
below, currently the case without exception, then COVID-19 apps will have to serve as a
complementary solution or as part of the solution in combination with other means of combatting
COVID-19, but not offer a complete solution to the current dilemma. The introduction of
COVID-19 apps has been accompanied by controversial debates about the privacy implications
of usage, location sharing and concerns over population monitoring (Cho et al. 2020; Redmiles
2020; Trang et al. 2020). Based on this trade-off between utility and privacy, COVID-19 apps
have yet to overcome challenges associated to obtaining true consent from users (Raskar et al.
2020). Despite the low adoption rates, experts acknowledge that hope still rests on COVID-19
apps to help contain the epidemic and “sustain a version of normalised social and economic life
after the pandemic lockdown in many countries” (Von Wyl et al; 2020). To enable uptake, a
better understanding of the users' perspective on COVID-19 apps and the factors that drive their
adoption is required. Our study builds on the large body of research in IS literature that has
studied information privacy (Bélanger and Crossler 2011; Smith et al. 2011; Xu et al. 2011) to
explain the dynamics of underlying user participation in the light of privacy concerns. Based on
the privacy calculus (Dinev and Hart 2006), we view adoption as a benefit-risk trade-off, which
the user undergoes, when deciding whether or not to adopt. More specifically, we ask the
following research question: What are users’ perceptions on the benefits and risks of COVID-19
contact tracing apps?
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Based on representative samples in Germany (n = 1,022) and Switzerland (n =1,006),
which are among the more successful adopters of COVID-19 apps, our study reveals
commonalities between both countries. Based on actual usage, we distinguish three groups of
users, as suggested by Trang et al. (2020), and draw attention to the significant differences in
benefit and risk perceptions between them: respondents that are pro-usage of COVID-19 apps
(advocates), who are against usage (critics), and the large group of users who are still undecided.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we provide a background on
COVID-19 apps emphasizing privacy concerns. We then develop a research model and present
our research approach. Afterwards, we present the empirical results and discuss our findings.
BACKGROUND
COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps
Contact tracing is a key control measure in the battle against infectious diseases.
According to the World Health Organization contact tracing denotes “the process of identifying,
assessing, and managing people who have been exposed to a disease to prevent onward
transmission” (WHO 2018, p. 2). In the case of COVID-19, contact tracing requires identifying
people who may have been exposed to the virus and following up with them daily for a period of
at least 14 days from the last point of exposure (Ahmed et al. 2020). The fact that symptom onset
may only occur days after infection makes it difficult for traditional approaches to map the
network of potential exposure traces and thus control the transmission rate of the virus.
Therefore, advanced techniques are required for effective contact tracing for COVID-19.
Mobile technology enables easier and faster contact tracing than traditional methods.
Governments and health authorities over the world therefore promote COVID-19 apps to
continuously track user’s proximity and to notify them in the event of possible COVID-19

Proceedings of the 15th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, India, December 12, 2020.

3

Bonner et al.

User Adoption of Contact Tracing Apps

exposure for self-isolation (Legendre et al. 2020). Mobile tracing mechanisms rely on
smartphone’s absolute location (in the case of location-based contact tracing using the Global
Positioning System / GPS) or relative location (in the case of proximity-based contact tracing via
Bluetooth Low Energy / BLE). Since privacy concerns represent barriers to adoption for a large
number of potential users and reservations in using authority-designed apps (Cho et al. 2020),
governments around the world have been continuously evaluating and enhancing the different
implementation options of contact tracing apps (Table 1). However, the critical mass adoption
threshold of 60% of the population remains unattainable worldwide (University of Oxford 2020).
Table 1. Overview of Contact Tracing Apps (as of October 12th 2020)
App

Launch Date Number of
users

% total
population

Technology

TraceTogether
(Singapore)

March 20th

+2.4M

~45%

based on legacy BLE

COVIDSafe
(Australia)

April 26th

+7M

~28%

based on legacy BLE

StopCOVID
(France)

June 2nd

+2.3M

~3%

ROBERT (centralized
based on legacy BLE)

+19.3M

~23%

+1.6M

~19%

Corona-Warn-App
June 16th
(Germany)
SwissCOVID
June 25th
(Switzerland)

Apple-Google
Exposure Notification
DP-3T and AppleGoogle Exposure
Notification

Among the first countries to develop and launch a proximity-based app was Singapore
with TraceTogether. As of mid-October 2020, the app has 2.3 million users indicating around
40% adoption rate (tracetogether.gov.sg). Based on the same framework, the Australian app
(COVIDSafe) boasts a user base of around 7 million, representing over a quarter of the
Australian population (Norman 2020). In Europe, uptake in most countries remains under
expectations. France, pursuing a centralized approach, has only 3% adoption of their
StopCOVID app (launched on June 2nd) (Rowe 2020) and was heavily criticized. Germany and
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Switzerland are two countries that are witnessing a higher rate of adoption in Europe; they
launched their apps in June 2020 and both follow a decentralized approach. Germany’s CoronaWarn-App has over 19.3 million users (over 23% of the population) 4 months after the launch
(RKI 2020). Switzerland's SwissCOVID app has reached 2.5 million downloads in October
2020, thereof 1.8 million (19% of the population) are classified as active users (FOPH 2020). In
the US, COVID-19 apps fall into the responsibility of each state’s public health authority.
Currently, 10 US states are supporting Google/Apple Exposure Notification, as a prerequisite for
a decentralized contact tracing approach, with New York and New Jersey being the latest to
launch COVID-19 apps (Leswing 2020).
Users’ Privacy Concerns for COVID-19 Apps
The major obstacles to achieving broader adoption for COVID-19 apps are often cited as
reservations about data privacy, possible identification or privacy infringements via location
tracking and fear of citizen monitoring by the state (Ahmed et al. 2020; Legendre et al. 2020).
COVID-19 apps require active information disclosure and sharing of sensitive data, such as
personal information, health information, contacts and possibly location information, which
results in privacy concerns. Fears arise around states establishing Corona maps like South Korea
has done (Klatt 2020), showing the movement of COVID-19 patients, whereby the health
authorities have access to everything from credit card information to CCTV camera footage.
Since privacy concerns represent barriers to adoption for a large number of potential users (Cho
et al. 2020), governments around the world have been continuously evaluating and enhancing the
different implementation options. There is a preference for applications that are privacypreserving and do not reveal any Personally Identifiable Information (PII) about their users
(Ahmed et al. 2020), which can put them at risk of being tracked or under government
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surveillance. This in turn aims at fostering the adoption of the apps and reaching a critical mass.
Walrave et al. (2020) highlight the ethical and legal user concerns for digital contact tracing,
calling for transparent relationship with the user and clear processing of their information.
Research Gap
COVID-19 apps represent true innovation and understanding what drives their adoption
is of paramount importance for societies globally. Therefore, for obtaining an increased uptake, it
is crucial to understand the user’s perspective on digital contact tracing (Redmiles 2020).
Existing studies on COVID-19 apps has mostly focused on the technology design for privacy
preserving apps (Ahmed et al. 2020; Cho et al. 2020; Yasaka et al. 2020). The few studies that
have investigate the user perspective (e.g., Trang et al. 2020) were conducted before these apps
were launched; they therefore lack the perspective from actual users and actual designs. This has
resulted in calls for research, for instance by Von Wyl et al. (2020), on the acceptability of
COVID-19 apps and adherence by the target population. A clear understanding of the benefit
structure (Trang et al. 2020) of COVID-19 apps is required, and the associated concerns should
be further explored. Understanding whether individuals are willing to share their data, and under
which circumstances, is vital for improving the app uptake within general populations.
RESEARCH MODEL
To understand the user's perspective, we build on theoretical concepts from privacy
literature on user adoption as a result of the end-user’s risk-benefit trade-off. The privacy
calculus framework (Dinev and Hart 2006) has gained popularity within IS research in
understanding an individual’s willingness to share personal information as well as location
information (Naous et al. 2019; Sun et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2009). It has also received attention in
terms of explaining this trade-off process in the intention to use mHealth technology (Anderson
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and Agarwal 2011; Rahman 2019; Zhang et al. 2018). The privacy calculus is therefore well
positioned to study the adoption of COVID-19 apps that are at the cusp of two domains within IS
research, namely location-based services and mHealth. Based on the privacy calculus model,
perceived benefits positively impact use of COVID-19 apps with perceived risk negatively
impacting adoption (Figure 1). No matter how well the risks of COVID-19 apps are minimized,
no risks are justified if they are not balanced by benefits (Martinez-Martin et al. 2020).

Figure 1. Privacy Calculus Model for Contact Tracing Apps

For understanding the benefit structure of COVID-19 apps, we build on and extend Trang
et al.’s (2020) benefit types, namely related to self and society. To also consider the professional
context, we distinguish benefits based on safety considerations at three levels: individual (or self),
society and workplace. First, individual safety benefits correspond to the app being able to detect

possible encounters with an infected person and receiving exposure notifications. Individual
benefits may also include getting notifications about safe places, i.e., identification of hotspots
and safe zones similar to MIT’s SafePlaces app. However, location sharing is a pre-requisite to
enjoy the benefit of safe places. Second, societal safety benefits whereby, in case the user tests
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positive for COVID-19, the app notifies their recent contacts, thus protecting family, friends and
public from infection. Societal benefits also comprise the benefit of generating epidemiological
insights with the goal of improving the quality of reporting on COVID-19 and performing
research that can help in curbing the spread of the virus. Third, workplace safety benefits, which
correspond to employers being able to monitor cases of COVID-19 amongst employees and take
necessary actions to implement safety measures within the company. For instance, in Singapore,
employers are encouraged to ensure that their employees have TraceTogether installed and
activated if they cannot work from home, as part of safety measures.
The risks related to COVID-19 apps for the individual user largely revolve around
disclosing sensitive information. Sharing contact information can generally result in
identification of users through their social graphs (Legendre et al. 2020). Infected users might be
particularly concerned since they share their health status information to facilitate exposure
notification. Moreover, sharing location information on the app can result in identification of
mobility patterns that can serve as diagnostic representation of sensitive demographic
information such as religious or political affiliation (Gambs et al. 2011). Privacy concerns may
impact both risk perception and intention to use. Based on the Concerns for Information Privacy
(CFIP) framework by Smith et al. (1996), the first two areas of concerns may be relevant for
COVID-19 apps, i.e. the misuse of the information by app providers, and unauthorized
secondary use of data by identifying personal aspects as social graphs and mobility patterns
(Legendre et al. 2020).
Two main constructs can help mitigate perceived privacy risks: privacy controls and
trust. Privacy settings on the app are a key measure for achieving information privacy (Malhotra
et al. 2004) and allow users to feel in control over their data sharing, in terms of both extent (how
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much personal data are being shared, when and where, and for what period) and type of
information shared (Ahmed et al. 2020; Trang et al. 2020). Trust is key for voluntary utilisation,
especially in places where it is difficult to enforce top-down (e.g., in well-functioning
democracies) (Gupta and De Gasperis 2020), and it can affect risk mitigation. Building on Dinev
and Hart's (2006) definition, it represents an individual’s belief that personal information shared
on the app will not be used opportunistically by a counterparty. It is a multi-dimensional
construct comprising trust in app providers based on treatment of data, and trust in the
government based on the relevant regulations as privacy assurance mechanisms. Finally, social
pressure or social norms (Min and Kim 2015) can have an impact on the use of CT apps.
RESEARCH APPROACH AND SURVEY INSTRUMENT
We chose Germany (Corona-Warn-App) and Switzerland (SwissCOVID) for the
purposes of our study as they are part of the “best-in-class” countries in Europe when it comes to
COVID-19 app adoption rates to date (cf. Table 1). We conducted an online survey with
representative samples from both countries, Switzerland (n = 1,006) and Germany (n = 1,022),
during the post-launch period of the national COVID-19 apps, to ensure that participants had the
possibility to access the app and gain first-hand experiences. Participants were recruited from a
commercial online panel via mailings. The respondents were smartphone owners and existing or
potential COVID-19 app users. We only included respondents who have at least heard about the
COVID-19 app and have basic knowledge of its functionalities. In Germany, we collected the
responses between June 25th and 28th after the launch of Corona-Warn-App on June 16th. For
Switzerland, responses were received between the 7th and 12th of July, also post app launch of
SwissCOVID app on June 25th. Uptake during this initial post-launch period was substantial but
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has flattened out since. The study setup was examined by the Ethics Committee within our
academic context, to guarantee anonymous participation and confidential data treatment.
Our questionnaire is composed of two parts: Part 1 comprises a series of questions
pertaining to demographics (age, gender, residence and questions related to smartphone apps
usage). Part 2 involves questions on users’ perceptions of benefits and risks associated to
COVID-19 app use, opinions concerning usage and sharing of information via the app, opinions
related to app providers and regulations in country of residence, and questions related to mobile
app usage and potential misuse of data. Questions in Part 2 were assessed on a seven-point Likert
scale (between 1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree).
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Our survey sample of both populations is representative across gender and age groups. A
moderate level of privacy consciousness is evident within both samples. In terms of smartphone
usage, over 75% of respondents use social networking apps and over 65% use navigation apps.
Table 2. Sample Demographics & Privacy Consciousness
Switzerland
Germany
Variable
Level
(n=1006)
(n=1022)
Male
49,5%
50,2%
Gender
Female
50,5%
49,8%
18-25
12,2%
11,9%
26-35
19,6%
17,9%
36-45
19,6%
16,2%
Age
46-55
21,6%
21,8%
56-65
17,6%
18,8%
66-75
9,4%
13,3%
Mobile App Usage
social networking apps 77,4%
75,3%
navigation apps
71,3%
67,8%
banking apps
62,5%
52,8%
not informed
40,9%
44,5%
Privacy Consciousness
moderately informed
47,5%
45,3%
well informed
11,6%
10,2%
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We asked respondents what best describes their current situation related to the COVID19 app in their country of residence. Based on the results (see Figure 2) and utilizing terminology
from Trang et al. (2020), we classify the population into advocates, critics and undecided, with
undecided representing the largest of the three groups, comprising 49.7% of the German survey
population and 46.1% of the Swiss survey population. We consider all respondents who are
following the news or have downloaded and tried the COVID-19 app in their respective country,
but do not use it as undecided. We designate all those currently using the COVID-19 app as
advocates, representing 26.8% of Swiss and 23.7% of German survey respondents. Critics are
classified as all respondents who have decided not to use the app or are simply not interested in
it, representing approximately 26.6% of the German survey population and 27.0% of the Swiss.

Figure 2. Attitudes towards use of COVID-19 apps for Swiss & German survey populations

Perceived Benefits
With regard to the population’s perception of the benefits of COVID-19 apps (first panel
in Table 3), we consider the three groups introduced above and analyse their level of agreement
on individual, societal and workplace safety. Both advocates and undecided have high levels of
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agreement (about 90% and 70%, respectively) concerning the benefits of proximity tracking on
individual safety, and their opinion is distinct from the critics. Indeed, the latter tend to disagree
that COVID-19 apps will reliably notify them upon exposure to the virus. When it comes to
informing about safe places where no COVID-19 cases have been detected, only about half of
the advocates and undecided agree on this benefit. However, this may also be explained by the
fact that this feature requires disclosing GPS traces and is not compatible with the privacy-aware
app design in Germany and Switzerland. A large share of the undecided population value
societal benefits, i.e., the notification of recent contacts, to the same high extent as proximity
tracking. Conversely, only one out of three of the critics agree on this benefit. Like the
perception of individual benefits of safe places, the apps’ support to help employers improve
workplace safety is less valued: even among advocates, less than half of the respondents agree on
the proposed item. Finally, more than 85% of the advocates and a large majority of the
undecided trust that the app allows authorities to better monitor the spread of COVID-19. For
critics in Germany, we find the lowest level of agreement (18.8%) of any above measure.
Perceived Risks and Concerns
Regarding perceived privacy risk and privacy concerns from the COVID-19 app (panel
"risk" in Table 3), less than 10% advocates feel that using the app is risky. On the other hand,
more than half of the critics perceive strong privacy risk. Only between 9% and 15% of
advocates in Switzerland and Germany are concerned about misuse of personal information, user
identification through mobility patterns, and exposure of social interactions. However, critics
express important privacy concerns and are particularly concerned about the misuse of
information with 59% agreeing on that statement. Throughout the proposed items, we
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observe that the undecided are positioned in the middle between advocates and critics. While
they clearly recognize the benefits, about one third of them perceive privacy concerns.
Perceived Control & Trust
While 78% of the advocates in Germany perceive that they control the data through
privacy-preserving settings in COVID-19 apps, this level only reaches 66% in Switzerland.
However, only about one in ten of the critics believe they are able to control their data. They
express a similarly low level of trust in government regulations or the app providers. On the
contrary, advocates in both countries strongly agree (shares of around 80%) that government
regulation protects from information misuse and that app providers are trustworthy and do not
misuse information. Regarding the undecided population, we observe that the group is split in
two either agreeing or disagreeing on the data control and trust items.
Social Norm & Government Actions
Respondents’ perception of social norms (last part in Table 3) indicate positive effects of
social circle, family and influencers on user’s intention to use the COVID-19 app. Close to half
of the advocates in Switzerland and approximately two thirds of the advocates in Germany agree
on the social pressure. We read that many users support COVID-19 apps out of social norms.
Regarding government actions, more than 80% of advocates are in agreement with government
actions in both countries. Even in the groups of undecided and critics, a large share agrees with
the government. Nevertheless, enforcing the use of the app is only acceptable for roughly two
thirds of the advocates, every third respondent of the undecided and about tenth of the critics.
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Table 3: Survey Results for Germany and Switzerland
Switzerland

Germany

Advocates Undecided Critics Advocates Undecided Critics

Benefits
Individual Safety - Proximity Tracking: I trust that the
COVID-19 app notifies me on exposure to the virus.
Individual Safety - Safe Places: I trust that the COVID19 app informs me about safe places where no COVID-19
cases have been detected.
Societal Safety: With the COVID-19 app, I am able to
notify my recent contacts in case of infection with
COVID-19.
Workplace Safety: With the COVID-19 app, my
employer is able to implement safety measures within the
company.

90,7%

70,5%

33,5%

91,7%

68,9%

25,4%

44,8%

50,4%

22,4%

52,9%

52,2%

22,8%

79,6%

68,3%

33,8%

84,3%

70,7%

32,7%

47,0%

43,3%

21,7%

46,3%

48,2%

21,3%

85,6%

66,8%

30,9%

86,8%

63,4%

18,8%

9,3%

26,9%

50,7%

7,9%

28,7%

54,4%

14,4%

36,4%

58,5%

9,5%

37,6%

59,2%

14,8%

33,8%

54,4%

13,2%

40,2%

51,8%

12,6%

31,5%

44,9%

9,1%

31,1%

49,6%

66,3%

43,3%

12,1%

78,1%

41,5%

10,7%

75,9%

48,5%

15,1%

81,8%

48,2%

11,4%

78,1%

50,2%

14,0%

80,2%

42,5%

11,8%

Social Norm: I feel that I should use the COVID-19 app
because everybody else seems to be using it.

47,8%

38,6%

8,8%

64,9%

37,4%

7,4%

Agreement with Government Actions: To which extent
do you agree with government's actions regarding
COVID-19?

84,8%

74,6%

48,5%

88,4%

70,7%

44,5%

Enforcement of COVID-10 app: Do you think that the
use of the COVID-19 app should be enforced by the
government?

66,3%

35,8%

12,9%

63,2%

37,2%

10,3%

Epidemiological Insights: I trust that, with the COVID19 app, authorities are able to better monitor the spread of
COVID-19.

Risks
Perceived Privacy Risk: I feel that using the COVID-19
app is risky.
Privacy Concerns - Misuse: I am concerned that with
the COVID-19 app my personal information could be
misused.
Privacy Concerns - Mobility Patterns: I am concerned
that with the COVID-19 app others can identify myself
through my mobility patterns.
Privacy Concerns - Social Interactions: I am concerned
that the COVID-19 app exposes my social interactions.

Control and Trust
Perceived Control: Privacy-preserving settings present
in COVID-19 apps allow me to have full control over the
data I provide.
Trust - Regulations: Government regulations protect me
from any misuse of my information on the COVID-19
app.
Trust - App Providers: I trust that COVID-19 app
providers are trustworthy and will not misuse any of my
information.

Social Norm & Government Actions
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SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
With this study, we contribute to the call for research on the users' perspective on
COVID-19 apps (von Wyl et al. 2020). Building on the privacy calculus, our study sees COVID19 app adoption decisions as benefit-risk trade-offs and provides empirical insights from
representative samples in Germany and Switzerland. Interestingly, we find many commonalities
between both countries, which may be explained by geographic and cultural proximity, as well
as similarities in app design. In both countries, the empirical data reveals significant differences
in benefit and risk perceptions between different segments of the population, which can be
related to the three groups (advocates, critics and undecided) outlined in Trang et al.’s (2020)
experimental study conducted in the pre-launch phase.
Our study adds to understanding the users' perspective on COVID-19 apps by exploring
benefits-risk trade-offs for these three groups: In line with the privacy calculus concept, all three
groups agree on individual, societal and epidemiological benefits. However, the perceived risks
offsets the benefits especially for the critics, and to a lesser extent for those undecided.
Advocates are characterized by a high level of agreement with the benefits and a lower
awareness of privacy risks and concerns. On the other end of the spectrum are the critics, who do
not fully neglect the app's benefits, but are very risk aware and concerned about misuse or
exposure of sensitive data. We have been very strict in our definitions of advocates and critics,
therefore leaving the remainder, with close to 50% of the respondents in both countries, as
undecided. While they clearly acknowledge the benefits, they are more aware of risks - although
they feel in control of their data and trust app providers and regulations. This means a large
portion of both populations are undecided whether or not COVID-19 apps are a good or a bad
thing for society in facing the COVID-19 threat.
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The user perspective we have provided here confirms that reservations about privacy are
the biggest hurdle to user critical mass of COVID-19 app uptake amongst the countries’
populations. For the undecided and critics, our empirical data also confirms the privacy paradox,
i.e., the differences between general attitudes and concrete behaviour: Despite their risk
awareness and privacy concerns, 3 in 4 critics use social media apps, which expose much more
sensitive personal information than the COVID-19 apps.
The micro or individual perspective on COVID-19 apps that we take in this study has
important implications: Understanding the user perceptions helps in addressing their privacy
concerns, mitigate their risk perceptions through dedicated measures for increasing the adoption.
First, it seems logical that it will prove difficult to sway the critics towards acceptance. The less
arduous task will be to convince the undecided and should be the immediate goal of app
providers and responsible governmental authorities. If presented with lockdown as an alternative
to use the country-respective app, people would certainly choose the lesser of the two evils, i.e.,
data privacy versus freedom and health (Rowe 2020). Retaining existing advocates and closing
the gap from number of downloads to number of active users is also key. A multiplier effect
could potentially be realized in having advocates advocate for more advocates, but our findings
also underpin that social norm is only relevant for approximately 40% of the undecided.
We acknowledge two main limitations of our study: The first limitation stems from the
reliance on the privacy calculus model, which views privacy-related-decision-making as a
rational process. While this model works well for explaining adoption by advocates and critics,
the group of undecided seems to have a less rationale behaviour. The second limitation is that
our sample is representative for Germany and Switzerland that have similar governmental
regulations and app designs, but may not be generalizable to other settings. Therefore, a cross-
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country lens can provide additional insights into the user’s risk-benefit trade-off, which is
governed by contextual and situational circumstances in their country.
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